Tous les articles par laetitiaguerlain

Colloque : Les peuples autochtones : quels droits ? quelle protection ? (24-25 mai, Aix-Marseille Université)


Les peuples autochtones : quels droits ? quelle protection ?

Du vendredi 24 mai 2019 au samedi 25 mai 2019


Un colloque sur un sujet très actuel mais qui n’attire malheureusement pas assez l’attention. Cet évènement a pour but de sensibiliser à la cause de la protection et de la reconnaissance pleines et entières des peuples autochtones et de leur patrimoine.

Nous mettons un point d’honneur sur la recherche d’intervenants de qualité et concernés par ces problématiques : ONG en contact direct avec les peuples, représentants d’autochtones, juristes, chercheurs spécialistes, etc.

Des temps d’échange seront organisés entre le public et les intervenants.

Se tiendra également une exposition de grands photographes professionnels dans le Hall principal de la Faculté de droit d’Aix-en-Provence, du lundi 20 mai au samedi 25 mai 2019.


Vendredi 24 mai 2019

13h30 : Accueil des participants et allocution de bienvenue

14h00 : Conférence introductive

Peuples autochtones et environnement : Écocide, biopiraterie, appropriation des expressions culturelles – Exemple du peuple Kanak en Nouvelle- Calédonie 
Mme. Subama Mapou, porte-parole IKAPALA et Comité Rhéébù Nùù

Reconnaissance et statut juridique des peuples autochtones 
Mr. Daniel Arboleda, doctorant AMU

15h30 : Pause

Table ronde n°1 – Droit à la terre

15h45 : Le droit de propriété des peuples autochtones 
Pr. Aurélie Laurent, université du Mans

Les menaces aux territoires – l’affaire Montagne d’Or 
Mme. Marine Calmet, représentante ONG Nature Rights

17h20 : Exposition et buffet

Discussions informelles entre les différents intervenants et le public autour d’un buffet et d’œuvres photographiques professionnelles

19h30 : Clôture

Samedi 25 mai 2019

9h00 : Accueil des participants / petit-déjeuner

Table ronde n°2 – l’importance des cultures autochtones

09h15 : Opportunités et contraintes du patrimoine culturel immatériel pour les cultures autochtones 
Pr. Laurent  Sébastien Fournier, Université AMU

La notion de “génocide culturel” – Le cas des residential schools au Canada 
Mme. Lorraine Dumont, doctorante AMU

10h45 : Pause

Table ronde n°3 – Les actions menées en faveur des peuples autochtones

11h00 : Les actions pour la préservation de la Culture – ACCB Bordeaux et les arrivants de Nouvelle- Calédonie 
Mme. Rachelle Hnawia, représentante Association ACCB

Protection des expressions culturelles, symboles et artisanat traditionnel 
Mme. Marine Calmet, représentante ONG Nature Rights

12h30 : Clôture et restauration

Accès gratuit, tout public

Faculté de droit et science politique
Amphithéâtre Favoreu
3 Avenue Robert Schuman
13100 Aix-en-Provence

Source :

Book Review: An Anthropology of Marxism by Cedric J. Robinson

In An Anthropology of Marxism, reissued posthumously, Cedric J. Robinson provides a novel lens for deconstructing the work of Karl Marx by challenging Marx’s assertion that capitalism is an essential precondition for socialism. Robinson’s account holds great potential as a tool of political praxis, writes Eric Loefflad, and its critique of Marxism offers a new dimension of Marxist strategy for today’s world. An Anthropology of Marxism. Cedric J. Robinson. Pluto Press. 2019. 
In the decade following the 2008 financial crisis, global inequality is rising, climate disaster is impending and far-right authoritarianism is enjoying one political victory after another. As existing institutional logics fail to explain, let alone rectify, these situations, it is unsurprising that Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism, long marginalised after the fall of the Soviet Union, is experiencing a resurgence. However, this renewed Marxist interest is accompanied by claims that Marxism is prone to rigidity/exclusionism in its theory of universal emancipation. Diverse in its manifestations, this line of critique has portrayed the Marxist tradition as flawed in its primary location of transformative agency in a predominantly white male industrial working class whose exploitation is facilitated by their status as formally equal agents. What is lost in this account is capitalism’s reliance on inequality-based structures that include: the uncompensated labour of women in the domestic sphere, racialised colonial dispossession and the coerced extraction of value from slaves, serfs and peasants.

Against this backdrop, Cedric J. Robinson’s An Anthropology of Marxism (hereinafter ‘Anthropology’) provides a novel lens for deconstructing the work of Marx and the critiques lodged against it. Reissued from its original 2001 edition with a foreword from HLT Quan and a preface by Avery Gordon, the central argument of the now deceased Robinson is that Marx was incorrect in his assertion that capitalism is an essential precondition for socialism. Here he frames Marx’s theoretical synthesis of German philosophy, English political economy and the French revolutionary legacy as failing to interrogate its own cultural and intellectual presumptions. Rather, by rejecting pre-Enlightenment emancipatory endeavours as inconsequential instances of ‘primitive socialism’, Marx embraced the very conceits of bourgeois ideology he purported to critique. From this premise, Robinson offers an alternative genealogy of socialism by turning to eleventh-, twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe. According to this narrative, peasant uprisings against the power of merchants, feudal lords and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church were driven by interpretations of Christianity that, in varying form, called for radical distributional and gender equality. This foundational eruption of socialism prompted the existing order to suppress these efforts through a reconfiguration of previously pluralistic Christian doctrines that labelled these popular movements as ‘heretical’. Yet, despite this concerted suppression, a formative socialism lived on through religious orders such as the Franciscans, and later the Jesuits, who attained influence as dispute resolvers and charity-providers throughout Europe and later its overseas colonies.

From here, Robinson shows how the legacies of formative socialism shaped the thought of both Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel, yet were excluded from Marx’s depiction of these theorists. Following this, Anthropology turns to Marx’s usage of Aristotle. Here Robinson claims that Aristotle’s conception of a political society of formally equal citizens, and its erasure of women and slaves, is reproduced in Marx’s conception of proletariat agency and its emphasis on formal equality as constitutive of capitalist social relations. For Robinson, this exclusion of medieval socialist formulations that centred the plight of formally unequal subjects was symptomatic of Marx’s investment in bourgeois Enlightenment conceptions of linear progress through rationality. Thus, under Marx’s influence:the originated discourse in Western socialism became subjugated knowledges. In their place socialism acquired an alternative and secularized natural history, one drawn from the discursive practices of scientific discourse and bourgeois hagiography (111).In evaluating Robinson’s argument, we must understand the intervention he was making in the context of Anthropology’s original 2001 publication. As Quan notes in the foreword, Robinson can be read as a response to the anti-socialist ethos of the post-Cold War era that purported to discard Marxism into the world-historic repository of failed ideas. Thus, in continuing the socialist project by unmooring it from its Marxist baggage, Robinson’s claim was ‘an unwavering act of faith in the ability and role of ordinary women and men to make their society anew’ (p. ix, notes omitted). While this may clarify Robinson’s purpose, it raises the question of how his analysis should be treated in our current moment in which Marxist critique has regained its relevance.That said, one means of engaging Robinson’s Anthropology is to understand it through the same modes of Marxist analysis it critiques. WhileAnthropology decries dialectical materialism as bourgeois intellectual arrogance that deprived socialism of its original promise, ironically Anthropology can be interpreted as presenting an extraordinarily innovative dialectic in its own right.  Here, if socialism, i.e. spiritual anti-hierarchical medieval communalism, was a ‘thesis’ that found its ‘antithesis’ in the individualistic rationality of the bourgeois Enlightenment, then Marxism can be understood as a ‘synthesis’ of the socialist ethic with Enlightenment analytical methods.This interpretation is supported by William Robert’s recent contextualisation of Capital within the workers’ movement of Marx’s time, which shows how Marx’s theory stemmed from claims that labour’s political goals required a sufficiently radical understanding of its distinct arena of struggle. If the medievally-rooted socialist ethic informed this backdrop of labour activism, then, far from ‘intellectual conceit’, Marx’s mastery over bourgeois theory for the purpose of levying an all-pervasive critique acted to prevent workers’ assertions from being co-opted by ultimately futile capitalist offerings of reform. While this view preserves Robinson’s premise that the existence of socialism is not contingent on the emergence of capitalism, it does add the caveat that perhaps socialism, at least in Marx’s context, required Marxism to resist capitalism.Nothing about this interpretation should detract from Robinson’s overarching point that we must decentre the agency of Marx’s privileged white male industrial working class when theorising anti-capitalist resistance. Although the Marxist tradition is certainly not without chauvinism in this regard, it has also been remarkably adaptive to self-critique. A key illustration of this is Onur Ince’s demonstration of how capitalist domination is a globally interconnected force, but its exploitation is experienced (and resisted) in different ways across varying temporal and spatial contexts that include wage labour, involuntary servitude and colonial dispossession. In taking this multi-layered perspective to the next level, Anthropology shows how postcolonial/decolonial critiques of Marxist orthodoxies regarding the non-European world also apply to Europe itself.Beyond its analytical value, Robinson’s account holds great potential as a tool of political praxis.  For what Anthropology confronts is the question of how exactly are we to make sense of the cultural and political significance of Europe’s medieval period in our current global moment? Especially in Europe and settler offshoots, this historical period is susceptible to being problematically invoked by both the liberal centre and the far right. For liberal centrists, this era can be characterised as an alleged ‘dark age’ of ignorant barbarism, and the fact that it was transcended justifies the narrative of linear progress. For the far right, this era acts as an alleged ‘golden age’ of pure white Christian identity that justifies the resurrection of violent, and potentially genocidal, fascism. Both of these narratives mischaracterise the material dynamics of the current global crisis and, in varying capacities, both are rooted in the belief in Western superiority over all other peoples. Through Robinson’s account, we are provided with a third option for understanding the contemporary meaning of Europe’s middle ages: a legacy of ordinary people struggling for emancipation against unjust material conditions. Thus, paradoxically, Anthropology’s relentless critique of Marxism offers great potential in forging an entirely new dimension of Marxist strategy in the actually-existing world.

Eric Loefflad is a PhD candidate in Law at the University of Kent, Canterbury. His current research focuses on the intertwined material histories of law, empire and the emergence of modern political consciousness.

Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics. 

bOOK REVIEW : Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: A Critical Introduction. Jim Reynolds. UBC Press. 2018.

Book Review: Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: A Critical Introduction by Jim Reynolds

Posted: 14 May 2019 06:13 AM PDTIn Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: A Critical IntroductionJim Reynolds offers an excellent new encapsulation of Canadian Aboriginal law, discussing 163 cases stretching from 1823 up until the present day and covering topics including sovereignty, Aboriginal title and treaties. Reynolds draws on his wealth of experience to provide a compendious summary of the development of Aboriginal law in Canada, writes Sarah PikeAboriginal Peoples and the Law: A Critical Introduction. Jim Reynolds. UBC Press. 2018.

‘Thoughtful and well-written (though brief!) analysis…’. This was part of the feedback I received in law school in 1993 on my Aboriginal Law paper about ‘Aboriginal title’, an Indigenous interest in land recognised by the common law. It occurs to me now, after practising Aboriginal law for much of the last 25 years and recently reading Jim Reynolds’s excellent new encapsulation of Canadian Aboriginal law, Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: A Critical Introduction, that my haste may not have been the only contributor to my brevity. In my defence – I now realise – there simply was a dearth of judicial decisions on my topic. Aboriginal Peoples makes clear from its very first page – a helpful one-page list of leading cases in Canadian Aboriginal law, stretching from 1823 (an American case) to 2016 – that there has been an explosion of Canadian judicial decisions concerning Aboriginal peoples and interests since the 1990s.
Of the 36 cases Reynolds lists on this opening page – his book discusses 163 overall – only ten had been decided when I was in law school. With respect to Aboriginal title, the subject matter of my paper, there were only two. The first was St. Catherine’s Milling (1888), decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England sitting in appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada (as it did then) but not involving any Indigenous parties. The second was Calder (1973), the first case brought by Indigenous plaintiffs for a declaration of Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court of Canada decided the case in 1973 but not on the merits, as the majority of the court held that the plaintiffs had not obtained the Crown’s consent to sue it – a fiat – as was required at the time. Reynolds discusses these two cases in several places in his book, most notably in a section entitled ‘History of the Law of Aboriginal Title’ (94-102).
Reynolds obtained his undergraduate law degree in 1967 and his PhD in law in 1970, both from the London School of Economics; he then taught at LSE for several years and qualified as a barrister in England, before becoming a barrister and solicitor in British Columbia in 1980. Over the last 40 years, he has had a front-row (and occasionally a driver’s) seat to many of the developments in Canadian Aboriginal law. Reynolds has now bestowed on us the benefit of his experience, teaching ability, concise writing and learned synthesis of how we got to where we are today in Canada with respect to the subject matters of his title: Aboriginal Peoples and the Law.
Aboriginal Peoples, as the publisher blurb explains, is aimed at ‘students taking both introductory and specialist courses in Aboriginal law, Indigenous studies, or the social sciences; lawyers with an interest in Aboriginal law; and journalists, government officials, business people, and other members of the public who want a better understanding of where the law stands today and where it should go in the future’. As a lawyer with several decades behind me, I learned something on nearly every page. Most importantly, I appreciated Reynolds’s explanation of the context in which the law has been made through judges’ decisions and also of the relationships between the history and the present and between various sub-fields of Aboriginal law. But I also used this book as my course textbook when I recently taught a law school Aboriginal Law course. My students, I believe, found Aboriginal Peoples a straightforward and easily-comprehensible explanation of the law that enabled them to get up to speed quickly and to begin to analyse current legal issues.
Each of the book’s eight chapters averages just under 30 pages and is well-written in plain English. Reynolds assumes the reader’s intelligence, but not that she is coming to the book with years of experience in Aboriginal law: indeed, his first chapter is entitled ‘What is Aboriginal Law?’. Reynolds includes an important second chapter on the ‘Historical Background’ to Aboriginal law in Canada, a topic indispensable to a proper understanding of Aboriginal law. Reynolds then adds a third foundational chapter, ‘Sovereignty and Aboriginal-Crown Relations’, again providing the reader with this essential overarching perspective.
The heart of Aboriginal Peoples – at least, perhaps, from a law student’s or lawyer’s perspective – is its middle chapters about ‘Aboriginal Rights and Title’, ‘Treaties’ and ‘Consultation, Accommodation, and Consent’. Here, Reynolds discusses the historical development of the caselaw on each broad legal topic, bringing the reader right up to the most recently-decided cases (as of mid-2018). He synthesises both judicial decisions and scholarship, enabling the reader to see the fabric that the law has woven, rather than only the threads making up that fabric.
Reynolds’s penultimate chapter addresses two vast topics:  ‘Indigenous and International Law’.  Indigenous law, in particular, is a rapidly-developing field as Indigenous peoples recover and develop their own laws and legal systems, many of which settler societies and legal systems around the world almost eradicated. Those who are interested in this field – in which there has been a bounty of Canadian legal academic writing in the last decade or more – might be disappointed that Reynolds does not provide more in this chapter. Some might also argue with his assertion that Indigenous laws ‘do not form part of the Canadian law except to the extent that they have been incorporated into Canadian common law’ (175). Yet Reynolds was relying on a judge’s decision in drawing that conclusion, and those who wish to read more about this topic – or any other that Reynolds so ably canvasses – can investigate further by following the plethora of footnotes accompanying each chapter.
In his final chapter, ‘A Just Society?’, Reynolds – appropriately – provides more questions than answers about the future of Aboriginal law in Canada, including ‘probably the most important question for non-Aboriginal people in areas such as British Columbia’ – Reynolds’s home and mine – ‘where treaties have not been signed and Aboriginal title still exists’. This question is: ‘what does Aboriginal title mean for private property rights?’ (200). Indeed, this aspect of Aboriginal title is now a topic for law school papers, and Reynolds’s book is an excellent place to start in understanding this still-unresolved conflict between two legal interests that both appear to ‘confer exclusive use and possession’ of land (201). Aboriginal Peoplesbrings the reader up-to-date with respect to the current caselaw on Aboriginal title, explaining the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Delgamuukw (1997), then Marshall; Bernard (2005) and, finally, Tsilhqot’in (2014) (see especially Chapter Four), thereby helping him to more fully understand the intricacies of the remaining questions.
Reynolds concludes Aboriginal Peoples with a section entitled ‘Evaluation of Existing Law’, writing in the first person, as he does on occasion through the book. In my experience, one of the difficulties in analysing Aboriginal law – whether a court decision or academic commentary – is perceiving the writer’s perspective, and I appreciated knowing when Reynolds was attempting to objectively explain the law and when he was commenting on it. His approach, I believe, contributes to the reader’s comprehension of the extent to which individual perspective affects Aboriginal law in Canada; indeed, this matter of ‘who is doing the writing?’ is itself one of the final topics Reynolds addresses. He provides his opinion that some of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Aboriginal law favour ‘liberal discourses of rights’, which include ‘an approach to equality that ignores, among other things, disparities in resources, political and social power, and social inequality generally’ (212-13). If a mark of a great book is that it makes one want to read further in the topic, then Reynolds has done a fine job. As is evident from this brief example, the questions and issues that Reynolds raises in his final pages are ones that not only law students and lawyers must consider, but also all citizens of Canada and many other settler nations as well.
That Reynolds provides us with his perspective occasionally in Aboriginal Peoples gives us a chance to reflect on how lucky we are as readers to be able to receive this, in addition to his compendious summary of the development of Aboriginal law in Canada. Were I to go back in my time machine to 1993 to discuss my paper with my law professor, I would keep Aboriginal Peoples and The Law: A Critical Introduction in my back pocket to help me better understand where we were in 1993, where we would be in 2018 and where we might very well end up in the years to come.

Sarah Pike is a lawyer in Vancouver, where she has worked since being called to the Bar of British Columbia in 1995. She has worked in a big firm, a small firm and government.  She has also been a graduate student in law and taught at a law school. Sarah is now a freelance lawyer practising Aboriginal and constitutional law through her own law firm, SPIKE Law.
Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics. 

Latest issue of the Journal of legal anthropology, Volume 2 (2018): Issue 2 (Dec 2018)

More information here :

call for writing-up fellowships at the Department “Law & Anthropology” at the Max planck institute for Social Anthropology in Halle

Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

The Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology is one of the leading centres for research in socialanthropology. Common to all research projects at the Max Planck Institute is the comparative analysis of social change; it is primarily in this domain that its researchers contribute to anthropological theory, though many programmes also have applied significance and political topicality.

The Law & Anthropology Department invites applications for Dissertation writing-up fellowships


One of the aims of the Law & Anthropology Department is to offer a stimulating interdisciplinary forum whereboth anthropologists and lawyers can engage with one another and conduct cutting-edge, policy-relevant research linked to the intensification of exchanges and encounters among and between societies, communities and cultures in today’s world. This calls for an in-depth assessment of the ways in which different normative orders and systems of morality coexist at various levels of decision-making.

The Law & Anthropology Department offers writing-up fellowships to enable doctoral candidates in the final stage of their programme to spend up to 6 months at the Institute to take advantage of its resources while finalizing their dissertations. The topic must be of immediate relevance to the Department’s research programme (see: The fellow must be prepared to participate in the activities of the Department during the fellowship period, and is expected to submit a working paper that addresses the topic of his or her research. A presentation of the doctoral research will be included in the Department’s seminar series.

A clear understanding must be reached in advance between the Director of the Department and the candidate’s principal supervisor regarding how the candidate can take fullest advantage of this period and how the home university and the Max Planck Institute can collaborate in the best interests of the candidate and of both institutions.

The writing-up fellowships can begin either in September 2019 or January 2020. The grants will be awarded for a period of 3 – 6 months. The Institute provides successful candidates with a monthly living stipend that is not taxable and is free of social security obligations.

The Max Planck Society is committed to an equal opportunity policy.

Application procedure

Applicants are asked to submit the following materials:

– cover letter;
– curriculum vitae;
– writing sample (chapter of the PhD dissertation);
– 1-2 page summary of the PhD work;
– photocopies of university degrees and transcripts;
– a letter of recommendation from the principal supervisor confirming that the applicant is in a position to complete the doctoral manuscript within the 3- to 6-month period (to be sent directly to the Department at

Please submit your application materials electronically by 30 April 2019 by following the link for vacancies onour homepage (under ‘Career’), or by going directly to the online application form using the link below.

If you have further questions regarding the application procedure, please contact:
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
Personnel Administration
Janka Diallo (

We look forward to receiving your completed online application under https://recruitingapp .

Further information on the research agenda of the Max Planck Institute is availableon our website:

Conférence de Laetitia Guerlain “Droit et Anthropologie dans la France des XIXe et XXe siècles. Un programme de recherches” (Rennes, 14 mars 2019)

Dans le cadre des Rencontres de l’IODE. Séminaire interdisciplinaire sur et autour du droit. Jeudi 14 mars 2019, à 12h30, en salle 10.

Cette conférence sera l’occasion de découvrir les rapports qu’entretient la discipline juridique avec les autres sciences humaines et sociales. Plus précisément, dans une perspective historique, elle présentera les interactions anciennes qui ont pu concourir à rapprocher l’anthropologie et le droit.

More information :

CALL FOR PAPERS: Law in Context Early Career Workshop, 17-18 September 2019

The International Journal of Law in Context and the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford jointly invite early career scholars to participate in a workshop to be held in Oxford, September 17-18, 2019. The purpose of this international workshop is to bring together scholars at a relatively early stage in their careers to support them in developing research projects and preparing publications to submit to scholarly journals in the field of socio-legal studies. 

During the workshop scholars will make a presentation, take part in discussion, and receive feedback on their work from senior research staff at the Centre and the editorial team of the Journal. The best papers presented at the workshop will be considered for publication in the International Journal of Law in Context.

The deadline for applications is 10 July 2019.

To be eligible to apply, the submission of a doctoral thesis is expected in 2019. Applications from inside and outside the UK are welcome. The ten best submissions will be selected and applicants will be invited to the workshop.
To make an application you should send a 1500-word extended abstract together with a cover letter with your name and contact information, details about your place of study or work, and the date of your expected or past doctoral submission. Abstracts may be on any contextual work dealing with law and its relationship with other social science disciplines.

Please send applications to Katie Hayward,

Meals and accommodation for one night in Oxford will be provided by the organisers. We expect that participants will pay for their own travel expenses.

Cultural expertise and socio-legal studies : Special issue of Studies in law, politics and society, vol. 78, 2019

This special issue of Studies in Law, Politics, and Society aims to foster a dialogue that is inclusive, constructive, and innovative in order to lay the basis for evaluating the usefulness and impact of cultural expertise in modern litigation. It investigates the scope of cultural expertise as a new socio-legal concept that broadly concerns the use of social sciences in connection with rights and the solution of conflicts. While the definition of cultural expertise is new, the conflicts it applies to are not, and these range from criminal law to civil law, including international human rights. In this special issue, socio-legal scientists with interdisciplinary backgrounds scrutinize the applicability of the notion of cultural expertise in Europe and the rest of the World. Cases include murder, female genital mutilation, earthquake claims, Islamic law, underage marriages, child custody, adoption, land rights, and asylum. The authors debate on a variety of themes, such as legal pluralism, ethnicity, causal determinism, reification of culture, and the “culturalization” of defendants. The volume concludes with an overview of the ethical implications of the definition of cultural expertise and suggestions for a way forward.

Introduction; Livia Holden

Part I. Cultural Expertise with(out) Cultural Experts

From Invisible to Visible: Locating Cultural Expertise in the Law Courts of Two Finnish Cities; Taina Cooke

Cultural Expertise in Italian Courts: Contexts, Cases and Issues; Antonello Ciccozzi and Giorgia Decarli

Part II. Sites of Cultural Expertise

Assessing Cultural Expertise in Portugal: Challenges and Opportunities; João Teixeira Lopes, Anabela Leão and Ligia Ferro

Cultural Expertise in Asylum Granting Procedure in Greece: Evaluating the Experiences and the Prospects; Helen Rethimiotaki

Part III. Comparative Perspectives on Cultural Expertise

Court Cases, Cultural Expertise, and FGM in Europe; Ruth Mestre and Sara Johnsdotter

Between Norms, Facts and Stereotypes: The Place of Culture and Ethnicity in Belgian and French Family Justice; Caroline Simon, Barbara Truffin and Anne Wyvekens

Part IV. Cultural Expertise in Non-European Contexts

Cultural Expertise in Australia: Colonial Laws, Customs, and Emergent Legal Pluralism; Ann Black

The Role and Use of Cultural Expertise in Litigation in South Africa. Can the Western World Learn Anything from a Mixed, Pluralistic Legal System? Christa Rautenbach

Part V. Suggestions for a Way Forward

Beyond Cultural Expert Witnessing: Toward an Integrated Definition of Cultural Expertise; Livia Holden

Format:Hardback ISBN:9781787695160
Published:28 Feb 2019
Publisher:Emerald Publishing
LimitedDimensions:216 pages – 152 x 229mm
Series:Studies in Law, Politics, and Society

Publisher’s website :

Journée d’études : L’ “aliéné indigène”. Justice et administration face à l’altérité psychique en Afrique française. Perspectives historiques et enjeux actuels (EHESS, 11 mars 2019)

Dans le contexte colonial français des siècles XIXeet XXe, que se passe-t-il lorsque l’altérité constitutive de l’« indigène » se double d’une différence supplémentaire qui touche à la sphère de la pathologie mentale ? Quelles sont les spécificités du traitement juridico-administratif de la folie ? Que les catégories et les discours de matrice coloniale nous apprennent-ils sur les politiques contemporaines de santé mentale ? Que reste-t-il de l’imaginaire colonial dans les pratiques et dans les discours institutionnels actuels autour de la santé mentale des populations d’origine africaine présentes en France ? Ces questionnements de fond sont à l’origine du projet AMIAF – « Aliéné mental » et « indigène ». Histoire juridique d’une double discrimination de statut en Afrique française (Fin XIXe  siècle-1960). Financé en 2018 par l’ANR dans le cadre des actions JCJC, le projet AMIAF se propose de réaliser une enquête historico-juridique relative aux discours et aux pratiques qui président à la construction et au fonctionnement du statut de l’« aliéné indigène » dans les territoires africains colonisés par la France. 

La demi-journée d’études exploratoire, qui fera suite à la première réunion de l’équipe du projet, vise à  poser les jalons de la recherche à venir, en focalisant l’attention sur les aspects méthodologiques de l’étude du traitement juridico-administratif de la folie en situation coloniale. Les communications seront centrées essentiellement sur la manière dont l’administration et la justice coloniale se sont saisies de la maladie mentale des populations africaines. Une attention spécifique sera accordée au rapport des institutions aux croyances et aux cultures locales, en prolongeant le regard sur les enjeux postcoloniaux. 


Réunion pour les membres de l’équipe du Projet ANR AMIAF


Accueil, introduction et présentation du projet ANR AMIAF


Discussion avec les membres de l’équipe du projet sur les apports et sur les perspectives de recherche de chacun.e,  sur les étapes futures du projet

12h00  Pause déjeuner


Demi-journée d’études ouverte au public


Romain Tiquet (Postdoctorant FNS, Département d’histoire générale, Université de Genève), Aliénés et condamnés : transfert et internement des “fous dangereux” au Sénégal (Fin XIXesiècle-1918)


Silvia Falconieri (CR, CNRS, IMAF), La « mentalité indigène » entre normalet pathologique. Lieux et modes du traitement juridico-administratif de la folie en Afrique française (1900-1940)

14h30   Discussion 

14h45   Pause


Sandra Fancello (DR, CNRS, IMAF), Sorcellerie, justice et santé mentale. Commentaire au documentaire « World of Witchcraft »


Projection du documentaire World of Witchcraftde Daniel Bogado.

16h30  Discussion 

17h00 Fin des travaux, pot de clôture (Salle réunion de l’IMAF)

Discussion animée par R. Collignon (CR, CNRS)

Avec la participation des membres de l’équipe de l’ANR AMIAF : S. Falconieri(CNRS, IMAF, responsable du projet) ; G. Aïdan(CNRS, CERSA) ; R. Collignon (CNRS, LESC) ; N. Derasse(Université de Lille, CHJ) ;  S. Fancello(CNRS, IMAF) ; J. Ferrand(Université de Grenoble, CERDAP) ;H. Ferrière(Université de Bretagne Occidentale) ; R. Gallien(Université Paris 7) ; A. Lainé(IMAF) ; T. Le Marc’Hadour(Université d’Artois, CHJ) ; E. Pestre(Université Paris 7, UFR Études psychanalytiques) ; F. Renucci (CNRS, IMAF), M. Scarfone(Université de Strasbourg) ; I. Thiébau(CNRS, IMAF), R. Tiquet(Université de Genève).

Otis ghislain (ed.), Contributions à l’étude des systèmes juridiques autochtones et coutumiers, HermanN, 2018

Cet ouvrage collectif sur les systèmes juridiques autochtones et coutumiers est publié au moment où la connaissance de ces systèmes, restés jusqu’à aujourd’hui largement invisibles aux yeux de la majorité, est plus que jamais nécessaire à ceux qui réfléchissent aux voies d’une nouvelle relation entre autochtones et non-autochtones, qu’ils soient juristes, décideurs ou universitaires. La reconnaissance des traditions juridiques autochtones est en effet devenue un thème central dans la quête d’une « réconciliation ». Les auteurs analysent des données recueillies par des équipes impliquant le plus souvent des collaborateurs ou des partenaires autochtones. Ils expliquent et comparent les aspects fondamentaux de plusieurs ordres juridiques autochtones et coutumiers afin d’éclairer leur spécificité, mais aussi leur degré d’ouverture au dialogue avec les cultures juridiques occidentales. En plus de mieux faire comprendre les modes de production du droit chez les peuples autochtones, cette publication permet au lecteur de découvrir comment ces peuples abordent le droit de la famille, le règlement des conflits et le rapport au territoire. 

Ghislain Otis est membre du Barreau du Québec et détient un Ph.D. de l’Université de Cambridge. Professeur à la section de droit civil de l’Université d’Ottawa, il est titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la diversité juridique et les peuples autochtones (niveau 1). Le professeur Otis est aussi membre de l’Académie des sciences sociales de la Société royale du Canada. Il dirige un grand partenariat international de recherche sur la gestion du pluralisme juridique en contexte autochtone (voir

190 pages.  24,00 €

Publisher’s website :

Book : Jessica Carlisle, Muslim Divorce in the Middle East: Contesting Divorce in the Contemporary Courts (2019)

Carlisle, J. Muslim Divorce in the Middle East: Contesting Divorce in the Contemporary Courts, Palgrave Pivot (Gender and Politics), 2019.

  • eBook ISBN 978-3-319-77007-9 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-77007-9
  • Hardcover ISBN 978-3-319-77006-2

  How have Muslim marriages legally ended around the turn of the 21st century? Who has the power to initiate and resist shari‘a derived divorce? When are husbands and wives made to bear the costs of their marital breakdown? What does divorce law indicate about the development of gender regimes in the Middle East and North Africa? 

  This book opens with a description of the historical development of Islamic divorce in the MENA. Subsequent chapters follow a Syrian male judge, a Moroccan female legal advice worker and a Libyan female judge as they deal with divorce cases in which husbands, wives, their relatives and lawyers debate gender roles in contemporary Muslim marriages. 

  MENA ‘state feminism’ has increasingly equalized men’s and women’s access to divorce and encouraged discussions about how spouses should treat each other in marriage. The real life outcomes of these reforms have often been surprising. Moreover, as the last chapter explores, jihadi proto-states (such as Islamic State) have violently rejected state feminist divorce law reform. 

  This accessible book will appeal to students, researchers and a general readership interested in Islamic law; Middle Eastern studies; gender and sexuality; and, legal and social anthropology.

To purchase the book :

call for papers : the philosophy of customary law

Call for Papers: The Philosophy of Customary Law

Special edition of the French journal Noesis


For more than 20 years, the peer-reviewed journal Noesishas been at the forefront of French contemporary philosophy. Affiliated to the Center for Research in the History of Ideas(CRHI) of the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Noesispublishes two special editions a year, collecting papers around a topic chosen by its scientific committee. The Philosophy of Customary Lawwill be the name of the Spring 2020 double issue. It follows the organization of a conference on the “Philosophy of Customary Law” in May 2018. 

The call

Far from considering the phrase “customary law” as a self-evident truth, papers will aim at identifying and trying to solve the many tensions created by the juxtaposition of two separate but parallel forms of social regulation: law and custom. What matters then is to investigate the ambiguity behind the very idea of customary law. Does it point out one more sort of law, or does it designate an autonomous kind of law, with its own features and not reducible to the law? 

Answering these questions requires without any doubts an enquiry about the peculiar dynamics of customary law, grounded on both empiricist and theoretical perspectives. To know whether it is a form among others of law or it is specific enough to be called a genus of law, it is crucial to define its principles. If this law is called customary it is because custom is key to it as a sourceof law. Understanding the specific features of customary law means therefore striving to understand what role custom plays to shape the very nature of customary law.

It will be necessary to investigate the way the main role assigned to customs determines the very existence of specific institutions and peculiar criteria of the bigger law frame that regulates the individual. Any legal system that includes custom as its element must establish spatial, temporal and logical frame of custom proofs. Nevertheless, Anglo-Saxon Common law and its peculiar principles mustn’t overshadow any attempt to grasp the principles and the peculiarities of customary law; and we will be particularly sensitive to the way the customary law settles in pluralist contexts, where different customary laws can be concurrent. In these conditions the interaction between law and custom takes the shape of a normative conflict more than of a coherent customary law. 

Exploring the limits and the fictions of customary procedures adopted by the Common Law could be the first step of both a new deployment of the customary law potential and an enquiry about its foundations. Indeed, it would be of extreme interest to study the different forms of customary law in eras where the Common Law model is spreading at different levels and domains, especially in international law, and where customary law is adopted in de-colonized regions where the law system is marked by a strong plurality of contexts.

Peculiar stakes of these contexts force to investigate both the limits and the flexibility of customary law. Do evolutions of scales and domains concern the essence of customary law, if this nature exists? Or are they only variations of a single nature beyond the peculiarities of each embodiment?  It will also be necessary – among other issues – to address the specific effectiveness of customary law, and to determine if it lays on the same constraint as the law; and if it is supported by peculiar institutions and applications. The question of the role of the sanctionis in this respect essential. 

In the wake of these reflections it is necessary to note that custom is reduced to the status of simple source of the law in every law called customary, and is therefore deprived of every autonomous form of normative power. It is not custom that is not acknowledged as custom according to the processes required and in the name of the institutions and criteria defined by law. In this case, custom is not anything more than one of the many possible sources of law, and concurring with them; it has not a primary juridical existence. 

This is the reason why John Austin could so easily disqualify custom self-sufficiency, arguing – with Hobbes and against the historical school – that the very nature of law prevents custom to be effective on its own besides the implicit or explicit, direct or indirect acknowledgement by the sovereign. One of the main ambitions of this collective publication would be indeed to question Austin’s position. This could in turn allow to address the issue of the substantial or accessory priority of the phrase “customary law”. Beyond this lies the very issue of the autonomy of custom as a social regulation tool.

In order to do that, one could be tempted to consider what disappears of custom and what does not, in customary law, so as to really understand its very nature. This brings us to discuss the specific subject of the codification of custom, the cornerstone of customary law. This codification is neverdefactoa neutral act, and it will be more relevant to point out from every point of view all the implicit tensions of the codification, which standardize and stabilize power balances or social and economic struggles. One of the axes of the study, already well known in social science but overlooked by philosophy, would be that of interaction between formal law and custom in de-colonized countries. 

Legal codification is one of these moments when powers and knowledge meet with most intensity. The “historical school” of law maintained the necessity of combining law studies with humanities, and we can now include social sciences such as economy, anthropology and sociology. We will therefore investigate which place these disciplines can or should have within the codification and definition of custom; we will also enquiry about their legitimacy, methods and approaches.  

The question arises of which place one should give to specific case studies in this volume. It is clear that they must be crucial while studying customary law as a theoretical object; but no discourse should be limited to a series of descriptions of different customary laws.

The following, non-exhaustive list of questions should allow to prefigure various leads:

Does “customary law” locutionshow a specific mode of social regulation between the juridical and the customary? Is custom a source of law? Or could be considered as an object beyond or before it? Does a specific form of customary law exist despite its different expressions? Does a model of customary law exist – such as the international law? 

Which transformations does custom endure when integrated with the “customary law”? Which philosophical implications does codification of custom produce within customary law? Which are the stakes of the very existence of customary law in pluralist and decolonized contexts? What are the relationships between customary law on one side and moral or juridical standards such as human rights on the other? What is the place of customary law within social change dynamics?

Which interactions and which concerns exist about humanities, social sciences and law with respect to custom? Which are the links of customary law with localities, territories, their history and their social displaying? How different disciplines of social and human sciences allow to reflect upon these phenomena and their conflict with law’s peculiar formality? 


The committee and the editors will make their selection from a set of complete papers only. Proposals will not be reviewed. 

Papers may be as long as 35.000 signs / 7.500 words. This does not include: the main title, abstracts, footnotes, the author’s presentationetc. Only the main text counts in the total of words. 

Papers may be written in French, English and Italian only. They should be sent to the following email addresses altogether, by June 1st, 2019.

To ensure an unbiased selection, the document must be anonymous. It must be modifiable, therefore .doc files are preferable. Please include in your email a separate document that states your name, affiliation, topics of interests. We should provide an answer by August 1st, 2019.  

Then, selected papers might need some modifications. The final versions of the papers will be due by September 15, 2019.